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THE DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION IN KENTUCKY
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation in the law of
wills is based essentially upon mistake. In all cases where a testator attempts to revoke an existing will by an act of cancellation
or mutilation to the instrument itself, the act of cancellation or
mutilation, in order to effect a revocation of the existing will,
must be dofie with the intention to revoke. The intention and the
act must concur. Otherwise the act is void. Thus, the doctrine
has been stated by an eminent English text writer as follows:
"Where the -act of cancellation or destruetion is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference
that the testator meant the revocation of the old will to depend
upon the efficacy of the new dispostiion, such will be the legal
effect of the transaction; therefore, if the will intended to be substituted is inoperative for defect of attestation or any other
cAuse, the revocation fails also and the original will remains in
force." I The basic theory of this doctrine is that the intention
of the testator at the time he did the act to revoke the existing
will was conditioned upon the validity of some other testamentary paper which he was about to make. If the other testa2nentary paper was never established, the prior intent was not
effective to give effect to the act. Then, since there was only an
act of revocation without an intent to revoke, the act was void
and the recovation was not accomplished. This doctrine is
called the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. That is,
the attempted revocation was dependent upon a related act which
never came to pass. Therefore, there was, in law, no revocation
at all. The original will still stands as it did in the first instance.
The intention of the testator is the test of the doctrine in all
cases.
The general doctrine in its entirety is applied in something
more than half of the states. It is accepted in many other states
with certain limitations.
In Kentucky we are confronted with a rather unique situation. So far as we have been able to find by a thorough search
of the books, there is no case in Kentucky that even considers
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation as such. The
21 Jarman on Wills 160.
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courts of this state have neither accepted or rejected it in express
terms. In no decision in this state are the words "dependent
relative revocation" used. However, there are several cases in
Kentucky that seem to involve the doctrine in substance. We
now turn to consider these tases to determine, if possible, the
probable effect they would have should the question be presented
to the courts of this state in a proper case.
In the case of Youse v. Forman2 there is a dictum as follows:
"There is a class of cases, to which, however, this does not belong, where the testator does an act of cancellation or mutilation
with the view of having his will immediately changed or altered;
where the act of cancellation and the reconstruction of the will
are intended as a part of the same transaction, ald the reconstruction or republication of the will is not perfected, then the
acts of cancellation are to be regarded also as incomplete because
of the failure of the other essential acts." This proposition, although it is dictum only, seems to involve the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in a modified or limited form. But it would
seem to limit it to the cases where the cancellation and the reconstruction of the new will are part and parcel of the same
transaction.
In the case of Wells v. Wells 3 the court of the county where
the testator died refused to probate the will because, according
to the view of the county court, it had been revoked by the testator before it was offered for probate. The will that was offered
for probate was proved by the subscribing witnesses thereto.
The capacity of the testator was not questioned. The will when
first executed was acknowledged and published. Some time
afterwards-the case does not say how long-the testator sent
for the amanuensis who wrote the will and one of the witnesses
thereto. The testator told the draftsman that he (the testator)
had determined to change one of the executors named in the original will, and to substitute another executor in his stead. The
person who wrote the will then erased the name of that executor
from the original will and inserted in the same place the name
of another individual whom the testator chose as executor. After
this erasure and insertion there was no formal publication of
2 5 Bush 337.
14 T. B. Monroe 152.
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the will before the same or other witnesses, or any other attempted compliance with the requisites of the statute. This was
the only ground urged by the contestants to invalidate the original will. The county court held that the original will had been
revoked by the erasure and substitution, and refused to allow it
to probate. The upper court reversed the lower court and ordered the will to be probated. The opinion of the court on this
this point is 's follows:
"It must strike every one who hears this statement that to
make such an act amount to the revocation of a will, once valid
and well executed, is to torture the act of the testator to speak a
language directly contrary to his evident intention; and the intenltion must always be sought for in express revocations. This
erasure did not and could not affect a single devise or bequest;
but rather confirmed them. So well settled is the law on this subject that striking out without republication even the name of a
deVisee after the publication of the will has been held to be a
revocation pro tanto only. Much stronger is the reason for not
holding the exchange of the name of an executor to be a revocation. The power of an executor generally extends to the personal estate only; he may be appointed or exchanged with one
witness only.
"The judgment of the county court is therefore held erroneous and must be reversed with costs. The will must be admit.
ted to record in this court, as fully proved, and then remanded
to the court below, there to be recorded and preserved, as fully
proved in this court."
The judgment admits the will to record in the upper court,
as fully proved, and then remands it to the lower court, there to
be recorded and preserved, as fully proved in the upper court.
This is provided for in the specifice words of the judgment. But
so far as we can determine from the opinion in the case the
court did not say who was to be the executor of the will. There
are three possibilities: First, that the original will as it stood
before the change was made was probated just as if there had
never been any attempted revocation of it and the persons named
therein as the executors of the estate were declared by the county
court to be the executors of the will as probated. Second, that
the erasure and insertion were considered as a revocation pro
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tanto only and the will admitted to probate with the name of one
executor stricken out and the other remaining executor made the
sole executor of the estate under the will as probated in this instance. Third, that the county court probated the will as it
stood after the erasure and insertion and allowed both of the persons named therein as executors to be the executors of the will
as it was probated in the country court. In the first case the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies. The situation is
treated as if the erasure and insertion were made only on the
condition that the will as it stood after the change was made was
valid. Then, since the altered will was not duly executed in
compliance with the statute, as the testator intended, the change
did not amount to a revocation of the part altered and the whole
will as originally executed still stands just as if no attempt had
been made to change it. This view of the case represents the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation in its general application. In the second proposition advanced, supra, the doctrine of
partial revocation applies without regard to the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The idea here is that the erasure
amounted to a revocation pro tanto only of the original will and
that the inserion of the name of another person as executor,
not being duly attested, did not become a part of the partially
revoked will. The third case seems to be the most improbable of
the three propositions advanced above as to the possible final
disposition made of the case in the county court under the decree of the upper court remanding the case with instructions to
the county court to probate the will. That is, it seems -absurdto
say that the county court probated the will as it stood after it
was changed because the altered instrument was never duly attested nor was the alteration therein ever attested by the witnesses to the original will or by other witnesses. Therefore, it
is almost certain that this view of the case is erroneous and was
not applied by the county court in making a final disposition of
the case.
In determining who will be the administrator of the estate
in a case of this sort the court will first have to decide whether
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is to obtain at all
in the jurisdiction in which the court is. If it does not obtain
in that jurdisdietion, then the court will probably apply the
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doctrine of partial revocation and allow the will to be probated
as it stood after the erasure was made. But if this question arises
in a jurisdiction where neither the doctrine of dependent relative revocation nor the doctrine of partial revocation is recognized, then the court must declare the whole will to be void when
it is presented for probate. If, however, the question comes up
in a state where the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
prevails, gnd also the doctrine of partial revocation, the court
will first have to decide whether the case at hand is one in which
either doctrine should be applied. In such a case the decisive
question will be whether the testator intended the act or erasure
and insertion to be an unconditional revocation pro tanto only
of the will or whether the intent of the testator was to make such
act or erasure and insertion contingent on the validity of the
altered instrument. If the latter is the case, then, since the act
or erasure and insertion was void for want of proper attestation,
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies and the
will should be probated as originally drawn.
Even in the jurisdictions where the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation obtains it is not ordinarily applied in the
cases where the testator destroys his will, when, at the time of
destroying the will, he merely intends at some indefinite future
time to make another will. This proposition was laid down in
the case om Semnmes v. Semmes, 4 a Maryland case where the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is generally applied in its
full scope. The indefiniteness of the time at which the future
will is to be made seems to have a great deal to do with this decision. Most other jurisdictions follow the same rule. We may
well expect the same principle to apply to the cases in Kentucky
if the doctrine is ever expressly recognized in this state. And
although the words "dependent relative revocation" are not
expressly used, this very proposition was -raised in the Kentucky
case of Sanders v. Babbitt.5 In this case the county court refused to probate a certain instrument propounded as a last will
and testament. In December, 1892, the testator had one of his
neighbors write his will -at his dictation which he subsequently
signed in the presence of two witnesses, who attested the will
'7 Har. & 3. (Md.)
8 106 Ky. 646, 51 S. W. 163.
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at his instance and request. He then gave the will to one of the
witnesses to keep until his death. Two years later he took the
will away from the witness to whom he had given it, telling him
as a reason for his taking it away that he wanted to make some
changes in it. Later he sent for the other subscribing witness
and told him what he wanted to do. After some discussion as to
the proper way to make the proposed changes, the testator told
the witness to cut his name and the names of the subscribing
witnesses from the paper, leaving the body of the instrument unchanged. Then the witness in the presence of and by the direction of the testator, made on the paper several additional bequests to the children of the testator and gave the instrument
back to him so he could have it properly attested. The testator
died within a year and this instrument was found among his
other papers, signed in his own handwriting but not attested.
The fourth clause of the will had been cancelled by being interlined in the testator's own handwriting and a memorandum had
been made on the will by him explaining his reasons for cancelling the fourth clause. The testator had never asked the witnesses of the original instrument to attest the will after the addition had been made to it. *When the will was offered for probate, the county court rejected it on the ground that the cutting
of the names of the testator and subscribing witnesses therefrom
by the testator's direction and in his presence was a revocation
of the will, and the paper never having thereafter heen re-executed as required by statute, it was adjudged by the court that
the instrument as offered was not entitled to be probated as a
last will and testament. The upper court was asked, on appeal,
to direct the county court to probate that part of the will which
remained after the signatures of the testator and of the attesting witnesses were cut off, upon the ground that the cutting of
the signatures from the will by the direction of the testator was
not done with the intent to revoke the will unconditionally and,
at all events, and that the addition thereto should only be treated
as a codicil. The Kentucky statute in regard to the revocation
of wills is a substantial re-enactment of the English Statute of
Frauds. It requires the act of revocation to be done with the
intent to revoke the will. The upper court held in this case that
the act of the testator in having his name and the names of the
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.ubscribing witnesses cut from the will indicated an intention
on his part to revoke the will unconditionally and at all events
and without any direct regard to future events or contingencies.
The opinion in part on this point is as follows:
"It is apparent that the controlling fact to be ascertained
in passing upon the question of revocation is, what was the intention of the deceased in having the signatures of himself and
of the attesting witnesses clipped from the paper? The signature is certainly an essential part of the will. Without it
there can be no will, and, if it was the purpose of the deceased
to revoke his will, no more effectual means could have been resorted to, short of the total destruction of the paper. The evidence of such intention is fortified by the fact that, in addition
to cutting off the signatures of himself and of the subscribing
witnesses, he made a number of important and material changes
in the disposition of his property, both by adding other clauses,
.and by erasing provisions previously inserted. It is certain that
the paper sought to be probated is essentially different from that
from which the signatures were clipped, and this is in itself persuasive of the intention of the deceased to revoke the other; and
that he thought the old will was revoked is conclusively shown
by the fact that he informed the draftsman, -after the additions
had been made, that he would have the new document properly
attested when the witnesses came out. After careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances connected with the mutilation of the old will, we are of the opinion that it was done by
the deceased with the intention of revoking it, and, as the new
will has never been revived by a re-execution thereof as provided by law, it was propery rejected as the last will and testament of decedent. For the reasons indicated the judgment is
affirmed."
The mere fact that the court refused to apply the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation in this case does not positively
mean that the doctrine could not be invoked in a proper case in
Kentucky. If the facts of this ease are transferred to a jurisdiction where the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is
recognized in express terms and applied in its full scope, it is
still not such a case as would come within the rule. The mere
fact that the testator destroys his will intending to make an-
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other will at some indefinite future time and fails to make the
will as he intended is not of itself a sufficient reason to invoke
the doctrine even in the states where it would ordinarily apply
in a proper case. This point was decided in the case of Semmes
v. Semmes, supra. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation
will never apply where a person has deliberately and intentionally cancelled his will, intending the cancellation as unconditional, even though he may intend to execute another will at
some indefinite future time. Therefore, the case of Sanders v.
Babbitt, supra,is not authority in point for the proposition that
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is rejected in the
law of Kentucky.
The result of our search of the books for cases in Kentucky
applying or rejecting the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in express terms is "no cases found." But the cases discussed above seem to involve the doctrine in some form even
though it may be only a modified form. The Kentucky court
has not precluded itself from adopting the doctrine of dependent relative revocation if and when a case involving such a revocation is presented to it and argued squarely on the basis that
where the act of cancellation or destruction is connected with the
making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the
testator meant the revocation of the old will to depend upon the
efficacy of the new disposition, such will be the legal effect of the
transaction; therefore, if the will intended to be substituted is
inoperative for defect of -attestation or any other cause, the revocation fails also and the original will remains in force. 6
WOODsON D. Scour.

I Jarman on Wills, 8ura, note (1).

